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Introduction 
Academics work within a complex network of institutions, and publishers 
are prominent in this network. But publishers are no longer the simple entities they 
once were in the Gutenberg galaxy. As the Reed Elsevier controversy shows, 
academic publishers can now be merely parts of large impersonal transnational 
information brokers, whose interests can extend from humanitarian medical 
journals to the provision of conferencing facilities for the arms trade
2
. It is not 
surprising that commercial publishers should seek to „add value‟ to whatever assets 
they have and can obtain. However, it is not so much the raw materials (data) or 
material products of old-fashioned information sharing (books and paper journals) 
                                                 
1  © David Murakami Wood, 2008 
2 This centres around Reed Elsevier‟s subsidiary, Reed Exhibitions, 
http://www.reedexpo.com/ the self-described „world‟s leading events organiser,‟ and its 
involvement in promoting the arms trade through its defence export exhibitions. It was Richard 
Smith, former editor of the Lancet and the other doctors and medical researchers whose campaign 
really worried Reed Elsevier (see Dyer, 2007). Some geographers played a supporting role. Despite 
promises to withdraw from this trade, the company had still not done so by the end of 2007 (Sunday 
Times, 2007)  
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that provide this added value, but various forms of combination, mixing and 
manipulation of data, including the growing trade in the products of surveillance: 
information about individuals and groups.  
Information is a commodity because it provides advantage and, coupled 
with categorisation, can generate new knowledges (Bowker and Star, 1999). The 
generation, ordering and circulation of such knowledges do not simply serve the 
purposes of power but are the very things that constitute it. This understanding of 
the nature of information was used to develop new ideas of how subjectivity could 
be managed in institutions, exemplified by the apparatus of the Panopticon 
(Foucault, 1977), and it was in this context that Giddens (1985) and Dandeker 
(1990) argued that surveillance was a key pillar of modernity. However in the new 
form of capitalism charted by Castells (1996-8), the circulations of information 
themselves provide the sources of profit, and the databases that store this 
information, the apparatus of „new surveillance‟ (Marx, 1988) in a „control society‟ 
(Deleuze 1991).  James Rule (1973) sketched out their potential at around the same 
time that Foucault was working on its prehistory, but it wasn‟t until Clarke (1988) 
coined the term „dataveillance‟, that we started to get a sense of what this would 
mean.  
Dataveillance does not displace surveillance, rather it intensifies and 
changes it. Computer databases enable the automated storage and categorisation of 
information. The effects are manifold but most importantly the humane objectives 
of panoptic surveillance become indirect or are entirely stripped away (Lianos, 
2001, 2004):  whereas the Panopticon was concerned with „soul-training‟, post-
panoptic surveillance requires no intention to generate a particular subjectivity, 
rather it is concerned only with the maintenance of orderly flows. This does not 
mean that databases are apolitical, but these politics are often hidden in the 
development of the algorithms that make up database software (Graham and Wood, 
2003).  
Databases do several things. They allow the ability to „mine‟ data, to make 
associations between different bits of information to create entirely new knowledge 
of the individual or group (Gandy, 1993). Data mining, can be defined as “a 
process which has as its goal the transformation of raw data into information which 
can be utilized as strategic intelligence within the context of an organisation‟s 
identifiable goals” (Gandy, 2006: 364). Often called „Knowledge Discovery in 
Databases‟ (KDD) (see: Pridmore, 2006), this reflects the crucial distinction that 
Gandy highlights between data mining and simple information retrieval.  
Databases make associations through the combination of different data. 
These associations can then be correlated to existing knowledge of behaviour, or to 
existing categorisations. For example, changing patterns of purchasing on a debit 
card can indicate lifestyle changes or pay increases, even pregnancy or sexuality. 
The accumulated categorisations of individuals and groups form the basis of 
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profiles, used to compare one individual or group to another. In policing, this 
manifests itself in „categorical suspicion,‟ where individuals are suspect because of 
the resemblance of their profiles to other existing criminal profiles (Norris, 2003). 
This can also mean categorical exclusion, and the profound sociospatial 
consequences that can accentuate disadvantage have been examined by several 
scholars (e.g.: Thrift and French, 2002; Graham and Wood, 2003; Burrows and 
Ellison, 2004; Burrows and Gane, 2006).   
It is in profiling where both the profit and the interest to political parties and 
security agencies are to be found.  The felt necessity of constructing more accurate 
„profiles,‟ more than the identification of already known criminals and terrorists, 
lies behind the proliferation of security schemes. There is no space here to go 
through all of these – as I finish this piece, the latest to be announced include the 
US „server in the sky‟ programme (Bowcott, 2008) and the EU‟s proposed 
requirements for international travellers to provide 17 additional pieces of personal 
information (Traynor, 2008). These will not be the last.  
Political criticism of surveillance has mostly been concerned with the 
relationship of state and citizen, and particularly where the state is felt to overstep 
the boundaries of normative or constitutional values, in particular those of 
accountability and privacy (see: Bennett and Raab, 2006). However the control 
society is also a product of the same crises that have also produced new neoliberal 
governmentality, wherein citizens are made responsible (and must pay) for things 
that were previously provided by the state (Rose, 1996). Here we can see the 
emergence of the „personal information economy‟ (Elmer, 2004) and the 
organizations that facilitate it. The state continues to be one such organization, but 
one amongst many, and the ways in which it works are increasingly managerial and 
contractual. Surveillance becomes generalized, and surveillance relationships are 
transformed through media, becoming synoptic (the watching of the few by the 
many – Matthiesen, 1997) and lateral, with citizens not simply the subjects of 
surveillance by both state and private corporations but involved in watching them 
and each other for fun and profit (see: Andrejevic, 2005). This does not just attack 
privacy but starts to generate new relationships that do not accept privacy as 
normative. In many ways, we are all required to be spies. However, we are not all 
possessed of the same capabilities for surveillance. The reconfiguration of 
power/knowledge is where we now turn. 
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Publishers as Spies in the Information Economy 
This all seems some distance from the world of academic books and 
journals, but it is not. Take the case of Reed Elsevier
3
. A major division of this 
growing transnational knowledge broker is LexisNexis
4
. LexisNexis is a company 
that most would think of as providing a newspaper clippings service. However, 
LexisNexis, through its Risk and Information Analytics Group
5
, is a major player 
in the data mining business and one which is associated with a number of 
companies and systems of dubious repute. It has gradually acquired many other 
major business associated not only with KDD for business and private use, but also 
with government contracting: RiskWise in 2000 (Business Wire, 2000), Seisint in 
2004 (LexisNexis, 2004) and ChoicePoint (2008)
6
. That these businesses were all 
American is reflective simply of the commodification of personal information in 
the United States in comparison to many other nations.  
The latter two companies are particularly interesting, and their histories are 
well covered in investigative journalist, Robert O‟Harrow‟s 2005 book, No Place 
to Hide. Seisint was the company that produced the Multistate Anti-terrorism 
Information Exchange Program (MATRIX). MATRIX was an advanced form of 
psychogeodemographic profiling (Pridmore, 2006) designed to combine 
information from state and commercial databases to connect existing suspects or 
indicate new ones. It acted as a kind of American states-level version of the US 
national Total Information Awareness (TIA) programme. Both programmes were 
eventually publically abandoned as overly intrusive, although it would be 
surprising if they did not continue in some covert form.  
ChoicePoint
7
 was even bigger. It had a huge set of super-computer based 
databases which it used for everything from insurance fraud, through its 
Comprehensive Loss Underwriting Exchange (CLUE) and employee-screening, 
                                                 
3 Reed Elsevier‟s main website it at http://www.reedelsevier.com/ Its front page emphasises 
the scholarly, with the slogan, „Inspiring Discovery‟ and gives no hint of its involvement in the 
trade in personal information. 
4 LexisNexis‟s website is at http://www.lexisnexis.com/ It is a typically glossy corporate 
production, claiming to be “a leading global provider of business information solutions to 
professionals.”  
5 According to the group‟s website http://risk.lexisnexis.com/ it “delivers actionable 
intelligence to help you make critical business decisions with confidence and speed.”  
6 At the time of writing the takeover had not been completed, and this website 
http://lexisnexisupdate.com/ promised to keep the situation updated. 
7 http://www.choicepoint.com/    
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pre-screening and drug-testing. Its main asset is a very complex set of KDD 
algorithms called Non-Obvious Relationship Awareness (NORA). As with Seisint, 
ChoicePoint has been subcontracted by a part of the US government, in this case 
the Justice Department in 2003, to link up and extend many of its dataveillance 
systems.  
Private corporate spies are now better equipped and more efficient than 
states at this kind of intelligence work, and O‟Harrow argues, effectively 
outsourcing state surveillance helps governments avoid legal constraints. This does 
not mean that they are any more competent. After its acquisition by LexisNexis, 
Seisint was involved in a huge loss of personal data in 2005 with records on over 
310,000 US citizens stolen from the firm. There is apparently no evidence of any 
fraud or identity theft as a result of this, however in 2005, ChoicePoint admitted the 
loss of over 163,000 records and according to the US Federal Trade Commission 
investigation that followed there were more than 800 consequent confirmed cases 
of identity theft (USFTC, 2006). The company was forced to pay a total of $15 
Million in fines and compensation. However perhaps even more concerning is that 
ChoicePoint was the owner of DBT, the company behind the mistaken or 
deliberately fraudulent removal of thousands of largely black voters from the 
electoral roles in advance of the 2000 US presidential election (USCCR, 2001).  
Reed Elsevier therefore now owns probably the largest and most 
sophisticated data-mining operation in the world, servicing both state and corporate 
components of the emerging surveillance society (Lyon, 2001; Murakami Wood et 
al, 2006). It screens workers, checks the backgrounds of migrants, scans electoral 
rolls, determines the potential risk and profitability of people worldwide. The 
company could in theory have effective control over many areas of personal life 
from the relatively trivial like how much junk mail one gets to the most serious 
such as whether can get a job, health insurance or vote.  
 
Ethical Places in the Academic Network  
There are three broad sets of responses for academics confronted with 
publishers becoming if not „Big Brother‟ then at least one of several little ones. The 
first is total acceptance. This can be on two grounds: moral or pragmatic. The 
moral case derives from the contention that the social good produced by these 
systems in terms of the combating of terrorism and crime, and perhaps from the 
convenience of increasingly accurate personalised marketing, outweighs the social 
bad of decreasing privacy and accountability. The pragmatic case is that nothing 
can be done. The latter can be dismissed as simple technological fatalism, but, the 
former is the current standpoint of increasing numbers in governments in the post-
911 era.  
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The second is engagement. Here one recognises the end of normative 
privacy and pervasive surveillance, but with three different orientations: firstly, 
increased regulation of state, private and individual collection and use of such data; 
secondly, greater or total transparency - for all the information and the tools to use 
it to be available to everyone; or finally, the encouragement of personal 
information economies. The regulation argument is advocated by many involved in 
data protection as a profession and by senior academics involved in the study of 
privacy (c.f.: Bennett and Raab, 2006).The transparency argument derives from the 
most libertarian theory of information – that it „wants to be free‟. This is advocated 
by Transparent Society thinkers (Brin, 1999) and the social entrepreneurs of the 
Open Source movement (c.f.: Stalder, 2001). The market argument is the logical 
extension of the commodification of more and more intimate aspects of personal 
life. It would allow control to those who either have the knowledge or the resources 
to engage someone or something else to manage their own personal information 
economy. Those without resources would be forced to derive what value they could 
from their own information, the virtual equivalent of selling a kidney. The irony is 
that those most desperate to sell their information would be those least likely to be 
of interest to profilers. Markets in personal information would tend to accentuate 
information inequality (Turrow, 2006).  
Finally, there is the response of active resistance or subversion. This can 
vary from an Luddite anti-technological impulse through Ellulian caution
8
, the 
„sousveillance‟ or „equiveillance‟ of Steve Mann et al. (2003) and others like the 
Surveillance Camera Players
9
 or the Guerilla Geographers
10
 who hold up 
technological, cultural or spatial mirrors to surveillance, to the illicit manipulation 
of data itself. Such efforts tend to concentrate on obvious visible public space 
surveillance like CCTV rather than dataveillance. One can see forms of system 
hacking as an equivalent for networked databases however, despite fervent hopes 
amongst some academics and the fear-mongering of police, the practice of hacking 
appears in general to be motivated mostly by self-promotion within an inward-
looking subculture rather than either progressive political or criminal motivations.  
It is difficult to see any emerging mass movement or single radical ethical 
position around personal information or surveillance, indeed there may be totally 
contradictory but equally radical and progressive impulses behind resistance, 
regulation and transparency. Whilst it may be clear that exhibitions promoting the 
                                                 
8 David Lyon is one major analyst particularly influenced by the thinking of Jacques Ellul – 
noting in Surveillance after September 11 (2003) that his work is still worth considering, despite his 
detractors.  
9 http://www.notbored.org/the-scp.html  
10 http://guerrillageography.blogspot.com/   
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arms trade are ethically wrong and therefore resistance necessary
11
, the ethics of 
the personal information economy are far less obvious and more complex. 
However there is an increasing reliance by states and companies on automated 
sorting of populations by categorization systems whose bases and rationales are 
opaque, that are subject to both contingent and systematic, and often uncorrectable, 
errors, and that are potentially or actually corrupt and damaging to social trust, 
personal privacy and civil liberties.  
In this context, at the very least an ethical production and consumption 
decision must surely be unavoidable: buying the products of or producing for such 
companies remains ethically dubious. We do not have to accept the inevitability of 
the dominance of the information economy by impersonal and amoral transnational 
information brokers. Other companies must be better choices. Yet the very 
technologies of interconnected computing and databases that allow data-mining 
also allow us to develop our own systems of production, distribution and 
consumption: journals like ACME and Surveillance & Society, C-theory and others 
are vibrant evidence of this. This is not a „geographical‟ message, but it is a 
message for geographers as critical scholars, who should, if nothing else choose to 
support and encourage these efforts.  
And beyond the ethics of scholarly engagement, the geographies of 
surveillance remain relatively poorly developed with sociological ideal-typical 
notions like „the surveillance society‟ still predominating over the investigation of 
surveillance in places, and the surveillant construction of spaces, with a handful of 
geographers actively involved. There is both room and requirement for more 
engagement and critical research. 
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